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Abstract 
Over the last three decades Argentina’s real output underwent violent and with frequent 
fluctuations. Moreover, the trend growth rates also varied with large amplitudes. The economic 
oscillations interacted with sometimes drastic changes in economic policies. Agents adapted to 
that environment with heterogeneous and variable results. This document tries to identify the 
interrelations between that macro performance and private behaviors, and their effects on the 
industrial structure.  
Fundamental dimensions of those behaviors include investment criteria, the time horizon 
over which corporate decisions are made, attitudes towards innovation and technological 
learning. The Argentine case highlights the consistency requirements between micro and macro 
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Introduction 
In recent decades –or, to establish a more specific starting point, since the middle of the 
seventies– Argentina’s real output underwent violent and frequent fluctuations. Intense variations 
in the short run combined with striking changes in the long run tendencies of the economy. The 
unstable behavior of the Argentine economy is outstanding even within the group of so called (for 
reasons that escape us) “developing countries”. Repeatedly, real volatility was observed to be 
associated with very poor economic growth.1 Therefore, short run effects and their dynamic 
interaction with long term effects disturbed investment and growth and caused an accumulation 
of irreversible losses of business assets –of tangible as well as intangible character–. In essence, 
the history of Argentina of the period has shown with ruthlessness that real volatility is very 
costly in social terms.  
The difficulty in identifying and extrapolating tendencies in income and expenditures was 
also reflected in the fierce fluctuations of per capita output in constant dollars:2 in 1980 Argentina 
generated a GDP that was similar to Spain’s until the recent revaluation of the euro; that is, 
approximately 15,000 dollars. This level was unsustainable and, a couple of years after, per capita 
output had fallen –after a crisis, naturally– to somewhere around 5,000 dollars. The instability of 
the late eighties, which culminated in the hyperinflationary episodes of 1989 and 1990, reduced 
GDP per capita so somewhat more than 3,000 dollars, a level that was lower than many other 
Latin American countries. But not long after, in the nineties, Argentina reached and maintained 
during almost a decade a GDP that oscillated around 8,000 dollars per capita. As a result of the 
post-convertibility depreciation and fall in the level of activity, the lowest value of the series is in 
the year 2002, with a level below 3,000 dollars. Despite evident economic recovery, in the year 
2005 per capita output reaches values just above 4,000 dollars. In short, observing the pattern of 
fluctuations of the last 30 years, the amplitude of the range of the series is striking (almost 5 to 1). 
Even more remarkable is the absence of periods of moderate and persistent growth without 
                                                     
1  The annual average growth rate of per capita output between 1950 and 2004 was a disappointing 0.6%. 
This performance intensified with time. Thus, between 1950 and 1974, the rate of annual increase of 
GDP per capita reached 1.3%, while in the period encompassing the last thirty years it was 0.1% per 
annum. While until 1974 the probability of experiencing a downturn was 20%, in the subsequent period 
that frequency increased in abrupt fashion until it reached a probability of half of the time (47%). 
2  In this calculation of output in dollars 2000 is taken as the base year.  
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shocks. This behavior occurs within a feedback process and interferes with the identification of 
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Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of official figures. 
 
Recently, various studies have presented empirical evidence demonstrating that high 
output volatility negatively affects long run economic growth, imposes high costs for the welfare 
of economic agents and adversely impacts on the poorest members of society.4 The studies show 
that these effects are particularly severe in developing countries. Two mechanisms are most 
frequently mentioned in the attempt to explain the negative correlation between volatility and 
growth: 1) that greater uncertainty reduces growth as investment falls and 2) that the existence of 
credit restrictions or imperfect access to the capital market aggravates the impact of short term 
volatility on long term growth by limiting the financing options of long term investment. In 
addition, the studies indicate that economic welfare is strongly reduced in the face of greater 
amplitude of fluctuations in consumption deriving from output volatility. Lastly, they show that 
the poorest sectors are most affected by these economic dynamics. Because they suffer limitations 
of access to financial markets, the most poor are unable to diversify risks associated with their 
main sources of income: salaries and government transfers. Also, because they use public 
services to a greater extent (e.g., health and education), they are subjected to the demonstrated 
procyclical pattern of public spending of developing countries, especially in times of economic 
crisis. In the Argentine case, extreme volatility resulted in a fiscal breakdown not only in terms of 
                                                     
3  Cf. Heymann and Sanguinetti (1998). 
4  Cf. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2005) and Aizenman and Pinto (2005) include recent surveys of the 
economic literature on the topic and Fanelli (2003) studies the Argentine case. 
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the sources of financing of expenditures but also in the erosion of the quality and contraction of 
the amounts destined to the provision of public goods. 
 
FIGURE 2 

















































Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of official figures. 
 
The above mentioned studies focus their analysis on some of the aggregate economic 
effects of real volatility. However, few studies exist that attempt to explain the microeconomic 
aspects of the decision making process of agents and its reciprocal influence on macroeconomic 
behavior in the case of countries characterized by high volatility and low institutional quality.  
This paper aims to identify in exploratory fashion some of the effects of real volatility on 
the structure of the industrial sector and on the evolution of the micro-economy of industrial 
companies, emphasizing that what happened after the most recent period of market reforms 
provides evidence that helps understand why macroeconomic sustainability and the solidity of 
micro foundations are two mutually dependent dimensions. Therefore, after a brief review of the 
history of industrialization in Argentina since the end of the 19th century, we proceed to the 
exploration of the micro-foundations of the decision making processes in high instability and 
economic reform contexts. The conceptual aspects used to advance in the understanding of the 
observed behavior constitute an eclectic collection of fragmented evidence rather than a unified 
body of theory.5 In particular, some of the questions that will be considered in the following 
sections are: uncertainty, investment and productive strategies; opening of the economy, learning 
and imports; effects of imperfect financial markets; the technological path and the trade 
liberalization; the evolutionary perspective and microeconomic dynamics; trends, fluctuations and 
perceptions of economic agents; heterogeneity and productivity gaps; differentiated responses of 
heterogeneous economic actors; idiosyncrasies in knowledge and crisis management. 
                                                     
5  Cf. Dal Bó and Kosacoff (1998), and López (2005). 
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1. A Brief History of Argentine Industrial 
Development  
The process of industrialization in Argentina found its beginnings at the end of the 19th century. 
Initially, the industrial sector was driven by an agroexporting open economy model based on the 
production of cereals and meat. With its vicissitudes, this setup lasted until the expansion of the 
agricultural frontier came to an end and the world was overcome by wars, economic crises and 
protectionism.6 Similarly to what was happening in other nations around the globe, in order to 
respond to this new scenario a new economic regime begun to develop from the thirties onwards. 
This new regime operated under the form of the so called “Import Substituting Industrialization 
Process” (ISI). Thereafter, industry gradually begun to occupy the most privileged position in the 
Argentine economy. Initially, the most prominent economic actors were the large state owned 
companies in sectors labeled “of national interest” (steel, iron, energy, transport, among others) 
and small and medium enterprise in the private sector that were stimulated by unsatisfied 
domestic demand and by the high trade tariffs (clothing, shoes, other consumption durables, 
simple machinery). 
From the fifties onward, industrial activity was the engine of the economy, of job creation 
and the basis for capital accumulation. In addition, a remarkable local technological capacity 
gradually developed, which became outstanding in Latin America. At the end of the nineteen 
fifties, the massive influx of subsidiaries of international companies in the industrial sector7 
transformed them into important actors in the local setting. This phenomenon shook the structure 
of existing markets, altered the forms of the organization of production and drove the 
development of activities that were new and more complex technologically and for which the 
demand was not satisfied locally (vehicles, pharmaceutical products, petrochemicals, agricultural 
equipment, processed foods). 
In the decade between 1964 and 1973, industry enjoyed continuous growth, without a 
single decrease in production in any given year. In addition, this latter period was characterized 
                                                     
6  Villanueva (1972) and Schvarzer (1996) showed that the strong industrial expansion of the thirties and 
beginning of the forties did not constitute a rupture with the dominant tendencies of the 20th century.  
7  Between 1957 and 1965 approximately 200 subsidiaries of the main international corporations set up 
their industrial production facilities in Argentina. Cf. Sourrouille et al. (1985). 
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by a fall in relative prices of industrial goods due to increases in productivity, a rise in industrial 
exports, an increase in the average size of plants (metalmechanics, and chemical and 
petrochemical activities were most dynamic) and the creation of employment at rates higher than 
the rate of increase of the population.  
Concurrently with this prolonged process of industrialization, after the Second World 
War external growth and commercial opportunities begun to reappear across the globe. As the 
substitution strategy became exhausted, the option of maintaining a closed economy subjected 
Argentina to progressive deterioration relative to other countries.8 On the other hand, the option 
of opening up the economy would harm the popular classes, whose interests were best protected 
by a strong currency that made exportable foods less expensive and by the protection of industry, 
which demanded a large amount of labor.  
In the middle of the nineteen seventies, this growth scheme faced an increasingly more 
evident set of difficulties. These difficulties included aspects related to the general functioning of 
the economy (balance of trade limitations and persistent inflation, among others), as well as those 
derived from the form of industrial organization that was unfolding (plants working at reduced 
scale, weak subcontracting and specialized supplier networks, low international competitiveness, 
among others). At the productive level, the local answer was an initial attempt at structural reform 
consisting in the opening up and modernizing of the economy within the framework of an abrupt 
appreciation of the local currency. During the four decades of ISI, a large amount of skills, 
knowledge, engineering capacity, equipment, human resources, an entrepreneurial base, etc. had 
accumulated. The “regressive” character of the industrial restructuring that took place did not 
attempt to rescue the positive aspects of the previous phase and thus valuable resources existing 
in the economy were not made use of. 
FIGURE 3 



























































Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of official figures. 
 
                                                     
8  Through import substitution Argentina grew even slower than other countries of the region that were 
better prepared for this industrialization strategy (for example, Brazil and Mexico).  
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From 1975 onward, the Argentine industrial sector lost its capacity for productive 
dynamism, for employment generation, and for leadership in the investment process that had 
characterized it in the past. Driven by changes in the international technological frontier and local 
instability and uncertainty, considerable modifications occurred at the institutional, sectorial, 
microeconomic and commercial integration levels. Gradually, a pattern of specialization 
characterized by the predominance of natural resource and capital intensive activities was taking 
root in Argentine industry. These are activities in which the weight of the labor factor in the 
production function is small and in which the larger economic agents have a central role. On the 
other hand, “knowledge” intensive activities, which utilize a large proportion of labor in their 
production functions and where Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) have considerable 
participation, were present in lesser proportion (Kosakoff and Ramos, 2001).  
For example, in the year 2004, Argentina produced a per capita industrial added value, 
that was 40% smaller than that which was produced thirty years before. During that period, the 
manufacturing sector had expelled labor, drastically reduced the number of plants and intensely 
increased the openness of its commerce. Thus, remarkable changes occurred in the nature and 
composition of industry. Today, we see a smaller, more concentrated industrial sector, 
characterized by high transnationalization and an organizational model of production of goods 
that is very different to that of the period of the semi-closed economy. Metalmechanic activities, 
which displayed the most dynamic behavior during ISI, now only represent one third of what they 
represented three decades ago. In addition, inherited from sectorial and regional public policies 
implemented since the beginning of the seventies that originally sought to strengthen the 
substitutive strategy and expand industrial capacity in capital intensive goods, the production of 
basic inputs (steel, aluminum, paper, petrochemicals, among others) became the new pattern of 
industrial specialization as a result of enormous transfers of public resources in its favor. Also, 
after four decades of stagnation, the natural resource sector, with the leadership of agriculture (in 
particular, of soybean production) and energy, expanded again and today is noted for being the 
most dynamic of sectors, a fact which is reflected in its substantial incorporation of new 
technology in recent times. 
 
TABLE 1 





Relative Intensity Industrial Activity 
(in %) 
Capital & imported 
inputs 
Automotive, Electric Machinery, Chemicals, 
Pharmaceutical, Audio, Packing Containers  
32.8 22.6 64.2
Labor & domestic 
inputs 
Commodities, Beverages, Cosmetics and Clearing 
Products, Appliances 
28.5 13.8 15.5
Labor & imported 
inputs 
Capital Goods, Parts and Components 5.5 9.0 8.4
Labor & domestic 
inputs 
Non Durable and Semi Durable Consumers Goods 33.3 54.6 12.0
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of official figures. 
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The structural pro-market reforms of the nineties left a set of lessons about the 
transformation of the productive apparatus. The rise of a business platform subjected to the 
restrictions of an accelerated process of trade liberalization (reinforced by the effects of a 
disproportionate appreciation of the exchange rate), to the imperfections of capital markets (with 
real interest rates at times inconsistent with production) and a framework of competitive and 
foreign trade policies that were not evaluated, examined or coordinated in any depth, gave rise to 
an extreme degree of exposure to international competition. Within this context activities based 
on natural resources and basic inputs, which were already endowed with considerable 
capabilities, quickly advanced towards the application of the best international practices. This 
explains to a great extent the export dynamics of the nineties: sales abroad based on natural 
resources displayed good performance and generated an outstanding mass of foreign currency, 
although they consisted of products reaching only the first stages of added value.9 
 
FIGURE 4 
EXPORT VOLUME PER CAPITA AND HODRICK-PRESCOTT TREND (1875-2004) 
(Hundreds of 1993 dollars per capita) 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of official figures. 
In contrast, there was a remarkable loss of social capital in wide sectors of the economy 
that could not adapt and the majority of activities resorted to survival strategies, moving from the 
world of production to the world of assembly and commercialization of imported inputs and 
products. The result of these processes was a pattern of specialization in exports that was 
                                                     
9  The performance of these products, along with that of the manufacture of gearboxes, valves, etc., is 
only comprehensible from an evolutionary perspective that combines routines, learning and selection. 
Also, it suggests that the local economy is ready to advance towards more sophisticated productive 
processes. 
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excessively concentrated in primary products and increases in productivity that occurred 
concurrently with the expulsion of labor and with negligible promotion of new productive 
initiatives.  
FIGURE 5 

























Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of official figures. 
 
The economic reforms caused imbalances, divers contradictory phenomena, 
heterogeneous responses. It is undeniable that economic processes are not linear and that 
therefore it is necessary to avoid falling into oversimplified models of analysis. For example, 
privatization and concessions of public services, although set within the framework of insufficient 
and inadequate regulatory schemes, set in motion a substantial modernization process of the 
infrastructure systems in telecommunications, energy, ports, etc. Furthermore, during a certain 
period of the post convertibility transition, there was a generalized perception that a process of 
massive destruction of entrepreneurial capacities had occurred. However, once again the business 
sector displayed a remarkable capacity to adapt to contexts of excessive uncertainty and loss of 
institutional quality. It was thus that industrial firms and those in natural resource activities found 
a transitory position that allowed them to continue with the exercise of their businesses and avoid 
the widespread closure of companies. The following pages attempt to bring to light some 
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2. The Investment Decision and Accumulation of 
Capabilities under Changing and High Uncertainty 
As was noted above, instability and elevated uncertainty are essential aspects for the 
understanding of Argentine industrial performance during recent decades. The economic history 
of Argentina demonstrates that in unstable economies with high uncertainty flexibility is a very 
valuable and tremendously profitable attribute. This fact should not be ignored in the analysis of 
the decision making process by economic agents.  
In contexts of high volatility and low institutional quality there is great uncertainty –which 
manifests itself in a multitude of ways– about the evolution of the economy and the planning 
horizon of firms becomes shorter. From a productive perspective, microeconomic behavior in 
general translates into a predominance of defensive strategies that negatively affect the “animal 
spirits” and long term growth, feeding back on the unstable workings of the system. Under these 
conditions, the predominant attitude is one of reluctance to invest in specific assets and to commit to 
long term strategies. Regarding investment in fixed capital, as well as in intangibles, and also in 
human capital, the maxim seems to be one and only one: wait and see. Thus, in Argentina, 
uncertainty and recurrent macroeconomic fluctuations induced microeconomic behavior that 
resulted in low growth and reinforced tensions at the aggregate level. 
In general, the economic activities of companies involve the willingness to invest in 
specific assets with different degrees of irreversibility. When the decision to incur in important 
sunk costs can be postponed in time, the company has the “option” of delaying this investment 
and maintaining open its alternatives. In this way, in the presence of scenarios of great instability, 
the economic value of “waiting” increases, and, for this reason, the accumulation of capital in the 
present does not exclusively reflect the discounted value of future income from investment. Firms 
must also be compensated for giving up the “option”, that is, for not being able to wait until they 
have a better understanding about pursuing different possible events. Thus, even in the case of 
projects with positive net present values, companies may decide to postpone their investments. 
Within this perspective of “real options”, the higher the uncertainty, the greater the threshold of 
profitability that companies will require in order to make their investment in the present (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). 
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The extreme volatility existing in the eighties drove economic agents to develop special 
capabilities to endure the situation. With average annual consumer price variations above 500% 
between 1982 and 1990, accompanied by sizable changes in relative prices and two 
hyperinflationary processes, along with frequent and abrupt modifications in economic policies 
and with the inherent instability of a process of transition towards democracy, very little margin 
was left for making decisions on investment that involved high entrepreneurial risk or substantial 
sunk costs, or that required great capacity by economic agents to foresee future scenarios. In fact, 
this highlights the importance of public policies: industrial policy attempted to resolve the 
uncertainties associated with basic inputs (generated in part by public policy itself). 
 
FIGURE 6 
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT, IN % OF GDP 
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Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of official figures. 
 
At the beginning of the nineties, the expansion of the decision making horizon introduced 
a change of primary importance for the formation of capital. A decade of “investment crises” had 
been left behind and, therefore, a wide field of opportunity for the modernization of production 
capacities was opening up. However, the sudden modification of the competitive environment 
and of the “rules of the game” introduced new uncertainties. The predominant analytical 
frameworks of the semi-closed economy were useless for evaluating decisions of investment in 
specific assets, of incorporation or replacement of lines of production, of human resource training 
within the company or of the identification of a technological learning path in a context of an 
open economy (Kosacoff, 2000). 
The development of an investment strategy begins in the evaluation of which are the 
necessary actions for surviving and prospering in a specific economic environment and if these 
actions are practicable by the firm. Its constituent parts are the level of vertical or horizontal 
integration of the company, its degree of participation in international flows, the pace of its 
technological progress and the ownership advantages it is endowed with. Despite the prominent 
role played by financial, technological and organizational aspects in the transfer of some local 
companies to foreign hands, the perception by local businessmen of being somewhat unable to 
adequately respond to the challenge of operating in an open economy and high 
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internationalization context was decisive in some cases. Within these circumstances, the strategic 
position defined by corporate offices of trans-national companies was crucial in diminishing some 
of these uncertainties.  
In the nineties, in industry, the uncertainties of microeconomics prevailed. Argentina 
became a laboratory for analytical cases of the response by economic agents to market reforms. It 
demonstrated that microeconomic actions have their own timing and their own sequence, and that 
this cannot be ignored when considering the aggregate consistency of a model of the functioning 
of the economy. 
In addition, given the change in economic regime that occurred in the nineties, it was 
difficult for economic agents to discern cycle from trend. As a consequence, some firms and 
investors made economic decisions based on forecasts of future income and demand growth that 
were not in fact realized. Also, in the middle of the boom in company mergers and acquisitions, the 
value of local firms incorporated projections of growth in the economy and its commercial partners. 
This mistaken perception about trends acted as a determinant of long term investment and, at the 
same time, the resulting behavior modified economic performance itself and influenced perceptions 
of other actors that also had to grope their way to forecast future evolution. 
As a result, some of the investments made in the middle of the decade assuming more 
optimistic scenarios in terms of economic returns than were to come true generated a growth in 
the financial debt of companies that became difficult to manage in a context of lesser returns and 
greater weight of interests resulting from the sharp restrictions to financing in general. Constantly 
increasing real interest rates drove companies to debt levels that in many cases exceeded the 
value of their assets. Thus, during the period 1998/2001 financing at 25% per annun within a 
context of price deflation resulted in a generalized process of summons to creditors' meetings. 
The average real exchange rate since the convertibility regime was abandoned is almost 
double that which presided over the economy during almost a decade. Nevertheless, in recent 
years, the import of final goods is the alternative being adopted by those industrial firms –in 
particular large ones– that have reached the limit of their installed capacity and still face excess 
demand from the domestic market. In aggregate terms, purchases of foreign goods during the first 
six months of 2005 were similar to those of 1997 when, with a GDP that was comparable, the 
exchange rate was considerably lower.  
In this situation, two different economic arguments about the behavior of local companies 
seem applicable. On the one hand, we have the above mentioned argument about the effects of 
uncertainty on economic decisions about irreversible but deferrable investment: a reticent attitude 
towards long term commitments and a greater value being put on “the waiting option”. As a 
consequence, if the long term perspectives are not clear, numerous local companies find it simpler 
to make the decision to import than the more complex decision to invest, develop suppliers or 
train human resources. This is so in particular because importing is an action that can be self-
financed and completed in a few months, while investing implies borrowing today in order to 
make irreversible commitments involving high uncertainty in the long term.  
On the other hand, a possible variant of the “beachhead effect” is applicable. In the 
middle of the eighties there was a revival of interest in research on the effects of the real 
exchange rate on the evolution of exports and imports in an economy. In this period, the 
American dollar displayed strong oscillations with respect to the main currencies of the world. Its 
initial persistent appreciation and the subsequent rise of imports affected the market position of a 
wide set of local companies of the United States and opened up the debate on whether the return 
to levels considered sustainable would revert those losses in market share.  
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FIGURE 7 




















































































Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of official figures. 
 
Within this context, several theoretical works emphasized the existence of hysteresis in 
the interaction between the exchange rate and international commerce.10 The basic assumption 
behind these models was that a company that does not export must pay a cost of entry in order to 
access the international market and that this cost is characteristically a sunk cost. As a 
consequence, given the so called “beachhead effect”, they suggested that imports would decrease 
slower than expected as the dollar weakened. This is so, because foreign exporters, once they 
made the investment in distribution channels, marketing, research, development, reputation, etc, 
would only expect to cover operating costs to stay in the market. Even if the real exchange rate 
returned to its previous level, the pattern of commerce would not. Although not very extensive 
yet, there are studies that provide empirical evidence about the relevance of exchange rate effects 
in the microeconomic decisions of firms on export market entry and exit.11 
A variant on this hypothesis is applicable to the interpretation of certain specific business 
attitudes present in the Argentine case. Thus, through this possible variant of the “beachhead 
effect”, the persistence of the open economy model stimulated a set of learning processes that 
were reinforced by a high real exchange rate that later became unsustainable. In fact, a salient 
feature of the productive conformation of the nineties was that industrial companies applied a 
strategy in which local production combined with import of supplies and final goods, with the 
purpose of taking advantage of the new rules of the economic order. In this way, the 
establishment of import channels for local companies during convertibility implied the 
development of processes of experimentation, routines and the payment of certain sunk costs that 
were not compensated once the macroeconomic situation changed.  
                                                     
10  Cf. Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989). Models were even presented in which those 
decisions prompted by overvaluation induced a permanent reduction of the equilibrium exchange rate of 
the economy.  
11  Cf. Campa (1993 and 2000), Roberts et al. (1995), Roberts and Tybout (1997). 
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3. Financial Markets and Microeconomic Behavior 
From a long term perspective, the weakness of the financial intermediation structure is a basic 
characteristic of the evolution of the Argentine economy. Meager financial deepening, the 
absence of certain long term markets, of risk management and of liquidity management markets 
have been permanent attributes that affected the investment process. In fact, in the Argentine 
case, several studies stressed that the weakness of capital markets impaired the selection process 
of investment projects, resulting in the absence of a strong core of entrepreneurs, and translating 
into serious difficulties to soften the fluctuations in cash flow and to diversify company risks. 
Usually, these characteristics in the microeconomic functioning of an economy will 
induce greater macroeconomic instability and the development of abrupt start and stop processes. 
In principle, this is so given that in such an economy it is difficult, for consumers as well as for 
businesses, to distribute the effects of a reduction in current income in time. Consequently, faced 
with negative shocks on the economy, economic agents will contract current expenditures beyond 
the extent to which this would happen in economies with more complete financial markets. Thus, 
they will disrupt the level of aggregate activity even to a greater degree, in general causing a 
recession. If such a recession expands, the financial position of firms and individuals will 
deteriorate even more, possibly to the point of affecting their solvency and perhaps even that of 
the economy as a whole.  
The existence of financial factors in the amplification of shocks on an economy has been 
a topic of interest in economic research in recent years (Bernanke et al., 1994; Hubbard, 1998). 
Certain imperfections in financial markets provoke discrepancies –which are variable throughout 
the business cycle– between the cost of own funds and those from a source outside the company. 
These can magnify relatively small shocks, which reduce equity and affect the value of its 
collateral. “Financial accelerator” models, which attempt to explain the effects of these operating 
characteristics on aggregate economic fluctuations, have been developed even considering 
economies with much more complete financial markets than Argentina’s.  
Despite these indissoluble attributes of its intermediation structure, Argentine industrial 
history can be divided in two distinctly differentiated periods in terms of the financing modalities 
of manufacturing activities. The first period begun in the middle of the forties, and was 
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symbolized by the creation of Banco de Crédito Industrial (Industrial Credit Bank)12 with the 
explicit purpose of giving subsidized financing to companies. It was a period in which the 
international perspectives introduced questions about the future after the rapid Argentine 
industrial growth of the crisis and World War years. This period came to an end with the drastic 
change in the pre-existing rules of the game resulting from the financial reform of 1977. 
A prominent characteristic of this period was that industrial companies were net financial 
debtors of the rest of the economy within a context of negative real interest rates. Guadagni 
(1972) showed that the real interest rates of the banking system applicable to loans registered 
positive values only in four of the 22 years between 1950 and 1971.13 Despite the fact that the 
inflation rate displayed wide fluctuations and that on average it was almost 30% per year (with 
annual peaks exceeding 100%), nominal interest rates in the banking system experienced few 
modifications and reached a maximum of 16% in the last year of the period being considered. In 
addition, in this high inflation situation with interest rates controlled by the monetary authority, 
while families reduced the quantity of financial instruments demanded in favor of real assets 
(particularly, in favor of durable goods, such as houses, or the purchase of automobiles), in 
businesses a similar process occurred: the importance of real assets, such as inventories, 
increased. With loans generally granted as a function of precepts provided by government 
economic policy, industrial companies organized production with criteria stemming from 
borrowing at negative interest rates. As a consequence, from the forties and until the middle of 
the seventies, negative real interest rates for industrial producers transmitted a clear message: to 
the extent possible, borrow in order to gain participation in the markets protected from 
international competition. 
From the end of the seventies on, once attempts to open up the economy were introduced, 
the described financial mechanism changed substantially. The preferential access by productive 
activities to financing with negative real interest rates existing in the substitution stage was 
eradicated by the Financial Reform of 1977. The main characteristics of the new system were the 
autonomous fixing of interest rates by financial entities, lack of constraints in granting and 
orienting credit, the absence of restrictions to the entry, operation and competition strategies of 
these entities, and freedom to take credit from foreign sources. In addition, the Banco Nacional de 
Desarrollo (National Development Bank)14 practically abandoned its function of generalized 
industrial development and concentrated in a reduced quantity of companies of larger size which 
were beneficiaries of industrial promotion systems.  
From that time on, except for brief exceptions, high real interest rates persisted in the 
system. At times, real rates largely exceeded levels that would have allowed any possibility of 
productive profitability and investment in external liquid assets or in public sector debt became 
more lucrative. In fact, the persistence of high positive real interest rates often diverted resources 
towards non-productive investments. Within a context of strong macroeconomic turbulence and 
                                                     
12  Previously, credit oriented towards industry was scarce and the longer term operations were only 
associated with the mortgage portfolio. The central features of this first period were analysed by 
Altimir, Santamaría and Sourrouille (1966), Itzcovich and Feldman (1969), Brodersohn (1972), 
Guadagni (1972) y Schvarzer (1981), among others. 
13  This behaviour had its counterpart in that in 21 of those 22 years of inflation with controlled interest 
rates, the rates on deposits were negative. Therefore, those who saved (as well as other economic 
agents) contributed through this “tax” to the financing of borrowers in the system and of the financial 
intermediaries themselves.  
14  Banco de Crédito Industrial (Industrial Credit Bank) created in 1944 underwent several modifications 
in its structure, range of action and form of operation through the years. Its name also changed in time 
to Banco Industrial de la República Argentina (Industrial Bank of the Argentine Republic) in 1952 and 
to Banco Nacional de Desarrollo (National Development Bank) in 1971. 
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high interest rates, the fate of many companies was determined by the ability of their finance 
management to administer financial liquid balances and adapt productive models to the new 
restrictions. The persistence of high positive interest rates had a big impact on the rationality of 
industrial organization. The financial weight of excess inventory management, of the 
administration of discontinuous processes with lengthy dead times, of the lack of systematization 
in purchase systems, etc., resulted in the gradual incorporation of automation technologies to the 
production lay out that spanned from process control and inventory management to the 
improvement of quality control systems, among others.  
According to economic theory, increases in real interest rates cause reductions in 
company inventories. However, during a long period of time empirical research did not find 
conclusive evidence to support this idea (Blinder and Maccini, 1991). This cast considerable 
doubt on the existence of one of the traditional channels by which it was suggested that monetary 
policy affected investment. A more recent line of research proposed that the answer could be 
found in the dynamics of the real interest rates themselves, which exhibit temporary variations 
around stable average values during extensive periods (regimes). In this way, firms would only 
modify their decisions about inventory levels to the degree that they perceived a change in real 
interest rates as persistent in time, that is, as a change in regime –a situation that is generally 
uncommon–. There is some evidence that support this hypothesis (Maccini et al., 2004).15 An 
argument of this type could account for the behavior displayed by Argentine industrial companies 
described above.  
In the history of Argentine industrial development, self financing (particularly, the 
reinvestment of profit) represented an increasingly important source of funds to firms. During ISI, 
high levels of protection and the concentrated industrial market structure itself allowed domestic 
prices that were substantially higher than international prices to finance capital accumulation by 
firms. The legal frameworks for industrial promotion were another key mechanism for the 
fostering of investment. In the case of bank credit, until the middle of the seventies, the larger 
firms were the ones that concentrated the access to credit or collateral (within a context of excess 
demand), while the main form of financing for the remaining companies was commercial credit. 
In fact, direct investment by international firms arrived in Argentina since the very beginning of 
its industrialization process. Since they enjoyed privileged access to local credit with negative 
interest rates, these companies operated with financing that was, to a large extent, from the local 
capital market. 
The change in real interest rate regime did not entail modifications in the persistent 
internal segmentation in terms of access to financing nor in the discrimination that particularly 
affected companies of smaller size. This segmentation was not neutral for financial administration 
even among larger size companies. In fact, these companies interacted with small and medium 
enterprises that were their suppliers and clients and in many cases acted as finance and capital 
market substitutes with the purpose of overcoming the above mentioned imperfections. The 
participation of large firms in reciprocal collateral systems, for example in the siderurgy and 
aluminum sectors, is representative of this situation.  
Credit rationing is a direct result of the effects of the information asymmetry in these 
markets. In the case of smaller size firms, these effects are aggravated by the accounting and 
administrative structure that characterizes them. In a case often presented in economic theory, the 
combined effects of interest rates on interests charged on credit and on the risk of the loan 
                                                     
15  Other studies postulate that in the short run the level of inventories is more influenced by financial 
restrictions and the company’s availability of internal resources than by the real interest rate itself 
(Kashyap et al, 1994; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). However, in the long run, when financial conditions 
allow it, firms will adjust inventories in accordance with the prevalent interest rates. 
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portfolio (originating in problems of moral hazard and adverse selection) result in a supply curve 
of credit institutions that does not monotonously increase with the interest rate and that therefore 
can lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). One way to reduce these problems 
(although not eliminating them completely) is to introduce high requirements in terms of real 
collateral. In addition, in the case of Argentina, the banks displayed a notable lack of capacity to 
correctly evaluate projects. To a considerable extent, efficiency problems in risk assessment 
impacted directly on productive processes. 
During the transition from a semi-closed to an open economy, difficulties in access to 
financing found the local offices of transnational companies and the large local economic 
conglomerates in very different positions. The former had better access to international capital 
markets, while there is empirical evidence showing the difficulties faced by the latter. In some 
cases, these difficulties led large locally owned companies to sell their market positions due to the 
imperfections of the capital market more than to their own tecnoproductive limitations. In other 
cases, local companies found it impossible to dissociate their nationality of origin from the 
country’s sovereignty risk. This distortion was one of the factors that motivated the purchase of 
the American oil company Maxus by the company called YPF at the time. 
It is also interesting to corroborate the association that existed between financing and the 
process of internationalization. Financing restrictions were one of the most important limiting 
factors for success in the internationalization process by Argentine companies. In Kosacoff 
(1999) this phenomenon and its consequences was analysed. The experience of the 
telecommunications company IMPSAT teaches us about the central role that financing plays in 
internationalization. In an early stage, this firm sought a technological alliance in order to 
increase capabilities and earn a reputation in the international market. For this purpose it 
partnered –with a participation of 25% of capital– with the Italian firm STET. To the degree that 
it positioned and acquired prestige, the limiting factor for international growth became financing 
at international rates. Therefore, in a second stage, it switched from its technological partner to 
the investment bank Morgan Stanley. This type of case illustrates that, although it is not possible 
to think of a business strategy that does not consider a complementary financing plan, it is 
undeniable that financial aspects acquire an outstanding dimension in projects associated with 
international expansion.  
The hyperinflationary episodes that occurred at the end of the eighties and beginning of 
the nineties in Argentina shrunk the financial markets almost to the point of their disappearance. 
Due to the conditions prevailing during the Convertibility Plan there was a substantial rise in the 
demand for financial assets (usually denominated in foreign currency) and in financial 
deepening.16 Furthermore, the increase in supply of financial assets and the initial fall in 
sovereignty risk allowed certain firms access to the voluntary market of international credit, 
which had been inaccessible to them in the eighties. This entry was facilitated in the nineties by 
international markets characterized by greater liquidity, a fall in rates and the appearance of new 
instruments. In this way, there was a tendency to increase the levels of leverage.17 Argentina 
became a learning laboratory for business management of operations in international capital 
markets. As a result of this process, finance departments developed sophisticated capabilities for 
the management of the different options arising from the opening of markets. The majority of 
                                                     
16  While in 1991, the total value of credit in the economy was around 5% of GDP, towards the end of the 
nineties it reached values around 25%. Also, the dollarized credit portfolio in the financial system 
increased from less than 40% to almost 70% of the total. 
17  Bebczuk, Fanelli and Pradelli (2002) calculated that between quarters 1992:I and 2000:III the net 
wealth of a certain set of companies that were listed in the stock exchange increased 22% in real terms, 
while the total debt of these firms in the same period rose 221%. 
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these companies opted for new instruments, which included negotiable obligations launched in 
local and international markets; credit lines originating in international financial organisms; 
participation in stock and derived instrument markets; etc. These types of operations required 
greater company transparency, among other elements, due to the stricter rules of international 
stock exchanges and regulations on the protection of stockholders.  
During the convertibility regime, the volatility of capital flow and its effect on the credit 
supply and the level of activity was a source of potential financial fragility. Also, industrial firms 
absorbed the fall in profit margins derived from the competition of imported products by 
commercializing greater volumes. The placement of products in the market implied credit 
transactions with terms of 150 to 180 days. This process occurred in a payment chain that was 
sensitive to economic fluctuations. In order to place these commercial credit operations industrial 
firms increased their levels of debt in dollars. Along the same lines, the relationship between 
firms’ long term debt (in dollars) and short term debt varied in a procyclic fashion. Although it 
made longer terms possible, the dollarization of debt caused a substantial rise in the devaluation 
risk, given a financial structure with income flow in local currency. Thus, negative shocks 
reduced leverage as well as the duration of debt: as equity of a company shrinks, creditors 
transfer their demand towards less mature debt. This increases the vulnerability of the firm as it 
has to finance longer term assets with short term liability. This process continued given that it 
encouraged creditors to cut terms even shorter.  
After the collapse of convertibility, starting in mid 2002 the progressive normalization of 
markets and the attenuation of uncertainty were related to the activation of domestic demand. 
Based on the dramatic reduction of labor costs and on the postponement of increases in prices of 
public services, the source of financing for production was the larger business margins. In 
summary, a fall in physical volumes of close to 20% took place, but it coupled with an abrupt 
recovery of the operating flows. Companies markedly reduced the terms of their commercial 
operations, arriving at a situation of near exclusive cash sale. During a long time, firms’ operating 
costs (salaries, public utility fees, taxes, rent, etc) remained practically unchanged in nominal 
terms. In contrast, prices of tradable goods increased significantly. The result was a marked 
improvement in the profit margins that, along with the recovery of cash flow, allowed self-
financing of investment and the restructuring of debt. Business self-financing is an extended 
characteristic that will most probably continue. However, in order to grow in a sustained fashion, 
Argentina needs a new spurt in the investment rate. This greater accumulation of capital must be 
financed. The creation of long run financial markets and a greater orientation of the credit system 
towards selection and financing of investment projects seem inevitable.  
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4. Technological capabilities and the supply  
of skills 
The industrial structure that emerged with ISI was characterized by small sized production plants; 
high vertical integration; the application of design, process and organization technologies far 
behind the international state of the art; “short series” production along with a ample mix of 
manufactured products and internal technological efforts aiming to copy or adapt foreign 
technologies through small changes. 
The size of a typical industrial facility during ISI did not reach even a tenth of the scale of 
a similar production plant in a developed country. In addition, given the immaturity of the 
productive structure and the absence of independent parts and spares suppliers, the degree of 
vertical integration of these companies was much higher than was predominant in the 
industrialized world. The production of “short series” of various products caused local companies 
to suffer considerable losses in terms of economies of scale. Similarly, lay-out and organization 
technologies had a rudimentary character that increased the incidence of “dead time” (Katz, 
1986). 
The technological challenge for industrial firms was to adapt and assimilate knowledge of 
foreign origin in a local environment with different prevailing relative prices, less division of 
labor and high transaction costs. These conditions induced companies to search for incremental 
improvements in their productive performance. But in order to incorporate knowledge (and in the 
same process generate new knowledge) it is necessary to master additional know-how. In this 
way, numerous companies reacted to the particular characteristics of the local context creating 
engineering departments within the firm with the purpose of achieving these improvements in 
productive design, in the manufacturing process itself or in the organization of work. Because 
they faced the same incentives as domestic firms, this behavior was displayed even by local 
subsidiaries of transnational companies, which, from the technological point of view followed the 
same path despite the fact that they claimed having know-how applied by the company in the 
developed world. 
From the perspective of static efficiency as well as from the very dynamics of the 
technological learning path, this set-up resulted in an accumulation of knowledge and 
idiosyncratic characteristics that did not converge with the international technical frontier. For 
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this reason, it is difficult to label this set of activities as immature industry, given that its 
evolution implied a final result that would not be arrived at by other societies. Despite the fact 
that it gradually diminished the productivity gap and permitted import substitution in a protected 
market, the “evolution dynamics” of ISI did not aim to increase the international competitiveness 
or the export capacity of firms in a systematic fashion until far into the seventies (Katz y 
Kosacoff, 1998). 
Similarly to what happened in the semi-closed economy of substitution, the knowledge 
and technology employed during the nineties were of foreign origin. However, the sudden 
opening of the economy and the exaggerated overvaluation of the real exchange rate imposed a 
ferocious competition with “state of the art” products. These conditions, which provided the 
framework for the economy, introduced new technological dynamics that were very different to 
the pattern observed during ISI. From a technological perspective, the increasing 
internationalization of production required specialization in products that were technically 
compatible with international standards. In this way, through progressive foreign supply, the 
process tended towards a reduction of the pre-existing gap in product technology while, at the 
same time, efforts to develop new products or processes or to adapt foreign technologies were 
minimized. In addition, this process occurred within a context of continuous weakening of the 
domestic supply chain. 
Thus, the processes of integration to international commerce networks were intensified in 
the case of a wide range of firms. This tendency allowed progress in a process of specialization 
and reduction in the mix of production, which occurred simultaneously with productive 
disintegration and a stronger reliance on commercial chains (Cimoli, 2005). As was mentioned 
above, from the perspective of an international comparison, the typical plant of the seventies had, 
among other characteristics, a relatively small scale of production and a significant productivity 
gap. In the nineties, although some modifications were introduced, it can be said that, in essence, 
those features were maintained. Some studies have shown that most of the industrial plants 
substantially differed in size compared to their competitors from Brazil as well as the rest of the 
world.18 
With regard to the direction of the innovation processes it can be said that, driven by the 
signals in relative prices, innovation activities of local companies were particularly concentrated 
in the purchase of technology embodied in capital goods.19 Along the same lines, other internal 
and external sources of knowledge and capacity building such as investment in Research and 
Development (R&D),20 transfer of technology, efforts in industrial engineering, in management 
and training or consulting, displayed relatively little importance. The resulting imbalance 
threatened the development of important capabilities, even those necessary for fully taking 
advantage of introduced equipment. Taken together, investment by manufacturing companies on 
innovation activities (particularly R&D) was limited in absolute terms and it was also inferior to 
that of other countries in the region as a proportion of turnover. According to the Second 
Innovation Survey, expenditure in innovation activities by Argentine industrial firms varied 
                                                     
18  In a study where comparisons were made in scales of production, it was shown that local plants were of 
smaller size in 78% of the 408 cases analyzed. In the cases where larger or equal scale existed, it was 
observed that 35% corresponded to the food sector, followed by chemicals-petrochemicals with 30% 
(Department of Economic Programming, 1994). 
19  Purchase of capital goods and hardware were more than 70% of expenditures in innovation activities 
(INDEC-SECYT-CEPAL, 2003). Cf. Anlló and Peirano (2005). 
20 The Argentine private sector displays scant participation in R&D (between 20% and 25%) within a 
domestic outlay (0.4% of GDP in 2003) that is in itself lower that the average in the region and very 
low when compared to that of other newly industrialized countries (SECYT-Ministry of Education, 
2005).  
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between 2% of total turnover in 1998 to 1.6% in 2001, while the corresponding index for R&D 
outlays was between 0.2% in 1998 and 0.3% in 2001.21 
In other words, with little investment in R&D in absolute as well as relative terms, 
industrial companies tended to increasingly rely on sources external to the firm for its 
technological endowments, mainly through the purchase of capital goods and information 
technology. This combined with the fact that import became the most dynamic factor of 
technology supply, particularly when it involved embodied technology but also in the case of the 
supply of disembodied technology (Yoguel and Rabetino, 2002). 
On the other hand, increased international competition forced a reaction of greater 
concern for the acquisition of organizational technologies. In particular, due to the modification 
of systems of production incorporating new criteria based on flexibility and specialization, 
(subcontracting, quality management, just-in-time, etc.), and to the consolidation of forms of 
organizing production that were unusual in the seventies (national economic conglomerates, 
alliances between local and foreign companies, complementation agreements, etc.), large national 
and international consulting companies displayed high levels of activity during part of this period 
(Fuchs, 1994), specially through the introduction of quality certification (Ramos, 1995). 
Another characteristic of this period was the productive retreat of “technology intensive” 
sectors, considered the engine of the most successful newly developed economies. In fact, the 
drop in output in local pharmachemicals, some capital goods, and electronics and 
telecommunications, deprived the local economy from the “spillover” effects that their 
development normally produces. Although different business strategies for the introduction of 
technological and organizational innovations coexist, recent studies suggest that those that are 
prevalent in Argentine industry are not the ones that provide greater probability of reaching solid 
and extensive competitive improvements in international markets. In general, there is an absence 
of strategies aiming to conquer new markets in productive sectors with more knowledge content. 
The economic scheme prevalent after the collapse of convertibility does not yet seem to have 
induced significant changes in business innovation strategies. A wait and see attitude is 
predominant. 
Finally, modernization and expansion of agri-food production during the nineties 
(resulting in double the annual tonnage of oil seeds and cereals of the previous decade, among 
other effects) allowed the overcoming of one of the main restrictions of the substitution system. 
This development arose from the introduction in the primary sector of a set of innovations and a 
complementary capitalization process that brought about a radical change in its productive 
structure. The widespread use of technologies originating in the developed world and 
commercialized in Argentina by transnational companies led to the expansion of the agricultural 
frontier. Some examples are the incorporation of genetically modified soybean, corn and cotton 
seeds; a greater use of fertilizers and agrochemicals; the proliferation of direct seeding and double 
cropping in agriculture; improvements in animal genetics; the development of feedlots in beef 
production and of new dairy techniques, and the use of new field storage technologies (BID-
CEPAL-Ministry of Economics, 2003; Bisang, 2003). 
In summary, within a framework of heterogeneous actions, industrial firms tended to 
display technological behavior associated with foreign supply, the dismantling of equipment for 
projects with greater local participation and an appreciation of organizational aspects, not only in 
production, but also in marketing and finance. The growing tendency towards the adoption of 
                                                     
21 In 2000, in the cases of Brazil and Uruguay expenditure by companies in innovation activities with 
respect to sales was 3.8% and 2.9% respectively, while the R&D indicator was 0.7% and 0.4% 
respectively. 
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product technology of foreign origin at levels close to best international practice went against the 
generation of local adaptive efforts. This tendency implied a smaller gap in terms of product 
technology, but a significant loss in the acquisition of domestic capabilities through research and 
development activities. However, the massive incorporation of imported machinery and 
equipment was necessarily accompanied by organizational changes and by greater investment in 
training. Also, the tendency towards de-verticalization of production consolidated fundamentally 
through the use of imported parts and spares, reducing the probability of creating production 
networks based on local subcontracting and having pronounced negative effects on the labor 
market (due to lower direct and indirect labor requirements as well as the loss of qualification in 
the “learning by doing” of human resources). 
ECLAC – Project document Microeconomic Behavior in High Uncertainty Environments: The case of Argentina 
31 
5. Heterogeneity and Economic Agents 
Perhaps the most salient aspect of the conformation of production during the nineties was 
heterogeneity. It is undeniable that not all economic agents reacted in a similar fashion to the 
challenge involved in a transition to new productive strategies in which local production 
combined with the import of inputs and final goods with the aim of taking advantage of the new 
economic rules of the game. 
Coexisting with an industrial apparatus of lesser size, a set of companies grew and not 
only increased their own previous productivity levels but also reached the best international 
standards in efficiency and practice. Pre-eminent in this group are activities in the agro-food 
sector and the restructured basic input industry associated with the public policies of the past. The 
most representative examples are the large steel and aluminum plants, oil refineries, 
petrochemicals, among others. They consist of efficient plants with excess supply capacity that 
sell abroad. Among them, we can also find some facilities from the automotive complex, and 
several firms that expanded in the mass consumption market. This group is characterized by its 
“offensive” restructuring, and a significant portion of their production is exported. Exposure to 
international markets provided them with the necessary motivation to increase their efforts to 
achieve higher productivity levels. The group consists of no more than 400 establishments and 
represents approximately 40% of industrial output. 
On the other hand we find the rest of the productive network, characterized by having 
reacted with so called “defensive” behavior. These companies, despite advances in productivity 
relative to their own past, are still far from the international technical frontier and continue to 
display certain features of the substitution strategy, such as small scales of production and limited 
economies of specialization (Kosacoff, 2000). 
In some cases, activities based on natural resources generated downstream effects that 
also resulted in the attainment of high levels of competitiveness. Such was the case of the candy 
industry, fine wines, oils, dairy products, lemons, among others. However, the aggregate behavior 
of these dynamic areas was not enough to result in a macroeconomic impact and propagation to 
the rest of activities. Within the framework of the recent structural changes in the Argentine 
economy, modification in business strategies and behavior prove to be highly complex processes, 
far removed from instantaneous adjustments and strongly influenced by history, context, and the 
firm’s own perceptions of the future. If there is one factor that emerges as a distinguishing feature 
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of business strategies and decisions, it is heterogeneity. Firms did not follow a common pattern, 
but, based on their own specific assets and advantages, they took different directions and 
postulated disparate long term visions and objectives. 
Although it does not yet attest a pattern of specialization, in recent years a body of 
evidence has evolved that shows the economy in condition to develop more sophisticated 
productive processes based not only on the use of natural resources but also of human capital and 
technology. There are notable cases such as those of the firms EDIVAL and BASSO (engine 
valves) in the district of Rafaela or TRANSAX (gear boxes) in Cordoba, the production of fine 
wines in various provinces, ARCOR (candies), the Santa Fe Province dairy complex, INVAP 
(nuclear reactors), among others. Certainly, these coexist with many stories of failures; hence the 
significance of undertaking case studies that give due importance to the vital role played by 
historical evolution.  
The analysis of firm behaviour based on a concept of the nature of companies as complex 
organizations that evolve in time in an interactive process with the market and institutions 
requires an approximation that includes a large quantity of determinants simultaneously. For 
example, EDIVAL was created in the mid fifties in the city of Rafaela as a family owned 
company that produced engine valves using rudimentary methods. Initially, it sold in the spares 
market and benefited from the passion for the sport of car-racing that existed in that city and its 
surroundings. At the beginning of the sixties its founders travel to Europe with the intention of 
obtaining quality materials and learning how their product was produced in industrialized 
countries in order to replicate these methods in Argentina. After developing machinery and 
operations similar to those in Europe, EDIVAL begins to conquer the finished product industry 
established in Argentina at the end of the sixties, making enormous efforts to meet technical 
standards. In the mid seventies, aided by a locally earned reputation, it decides to enter the United 
States market with its valves for competition and road cars. It thus discovered a difficult but 
profitable market niche: the high performance competition market, which allowed it to advance 
during almost a decade until it was able to enter the international market of standard valves. This 
latter achievement was attained only in the mid eighties, when it signed a sizable contract in the 
United States that marked the transformation of the company to exporter of original equipment in 
some cases, and, in others, to an alternative in the spares export market.  
Thus, EDIVAL evolved with the needs of the world market while most Argentine 
companies continued to operate in an almost totally captive market. During the nineties, trade 
liberalization and the appreciation of the local currency combined with a generational change in 
management to complicate the evolution of the company. Within this context, it undertook a risky 
project: to become a global player in the original equipment supply market. In 2002, once a 
process of professionalization in company leadership was completed, EDIVAL purchased a plant 
in Portugal in order to increase its production capacity and “get closer” to European clients. 
Today, EDIVAL is the fourth producer and exporter of valves in the world and has become 
supplier of automotive producers at their headquarters worldwide despite the distance that 
separates them from the city of Rafaela.  
As Ascúa pointed out in his study about the company,22 “the case of EDIVAL is 
interesting not only from the historical point of view, but also from the academic stand, especially 
in order to better understand globalization processes and their impact on developing countries. 
During fifty years, this company of humble beginnings has shown that it is possible to build a 
business model that generates dynamic competitiveness, competing first with other domestic 
firms and later with dominant transnational ones.” Despite the certainty that the case of each 
                                                     
22 Cf. Ascuá (2003). 
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company has its own specificity, its own limitations and historical elements of difficult 
reproduction, a business strategy in permanent adaptation aimed at a path of growth, the ability to 
identify and take advantage of opportunities, the emphasis on the development of technical 
capabilities and continuous learning are all elements in the course of EDIVAL’s evolution that 
provide lessons for other cases. 
INVAP is another such example. It was created by an agreement between the National 
Commission of Atomic Energy (Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica or CNEA) and the 
government of the Province of Río Negro. It is well known as an exporter of nuclear facilities, 
and control systems and equipment for nuclear technology. It has also exported cobalt-therapy 
machines and automation systems and equipment for industrial projects.  
The story of INVAP begins at the end of the forties, with the Huemul Project for the 
construction of an atomic assay lab. The failure of this project resulted in its reorganization at the 
beginning of the fifties with the new function of developing knowledge and technologies for an 
Argentine nuclear complex. It is thus that the Bariloche Atomic Center (Centro Atómico de 
Bariloche or CAB) was created. It was to pursue the study of certain fields of knowledge in 
response to the specific demands of CNEA. At the end of the fifties, CNEA launched its first 
experimental reactor built in the country and at the beginning of the seventies, CAB created the 
Department of Applied Research (Área de Investigaciones Aplicadas) that would seek to take 
advantage of the experience acquired in the field of experimental research in order to work on 
problems of a practical nature. This step was associated with the decision to build the first nuclear 
plant in the country.  
In the middle of the seventies, INVAP was created from a division of the Applied 
Research Department. It initiated its activities as contractor of CNEA in the manufacture of 
equipment for the supply of combustible elements for a second nuclear plant, in an international 
setting of strong restrictions to the acquisition of nuclear technology. In the eighties, the 
technological progress made by INVAP allowed it to obtain its first turnkey-plant export 
contracts. The crisis of the late eighties affected resource availability and it drastically reduced its 
staff. Some of its former employees created their own companies and became its suppliers. 
INVAP entered new fields related to space activities and communications and information 
technology. Finally, the nineties were the decade in which INVAP consolidated its take-off. 
During this period, it deepened its penetration of foreign markets as supplier of nuclear 
technology, which culminated in 2000 with its winning a contract for the construction of a 
research nuclear reactor for Australia (Lugones and Lugones, 2004). 
Thus, any effort to explain the complexity of such phenomena is necessarily partial and 
subject to limitations. The perspective provided by evolution theory is a central element in the 
understanding of these long term processes, with their ups and downs and their co-evolution with 
macroeconomic dynamics. Despite the striking dearth of company case studies, there are some 
works that merit mention, such as Gutiérrez (1999), which analyzed the evolution of IMPSA; 
Kosacoff et al. (2001) which studied the ARCOR group; Ordóñez and Nichols (2003) and the 
Grobo case; Vispo and Kosacoff (1991) for the analysis of IBM Argentina; Schvarzer (1989) and 
the experience of Bunge and Born; Artopoulos (2004) and the Teching group; and Barbero 
(1998). 
During the nineties, as State owned companies disappear and the presence of large 
independent local companies is reduced, the presence of foreign companies increases 
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remarkably.23 Business structure had already changed considerably at the beginning of the 
decade, given the active participation of foreign investors in the privatization process. But it is 
from 1995 onwards that the extraordinary growth in the transfer of private sector industrial firms 
takes place. Although the presence of foreign capital in manufacturing is not new, it increased 
substantially.24 
Notwithstanding the importance of Argentine endowment in natural resources as a 
location advantage for investments in agroindustrial, mining and petroleum commodities, FDI 
concentrated on those sectors most stimulated by a dynamic demand. Despite the fact that the 
opening of the economy –within the framework of an exchange rate misalignment– generated an 
unfavourable bias against domestic production of tradable manufacturing goods, the dynamism 
displayed by domestic and regional demand in the greater part of the decade became a decisive 
factor for the investment decisions of Transnational Companies (TNC), both for established firms 
and “newcomers”.  
FIGURE 8 





















































Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of official figures. 
 
The imperfections of financial and capital markets and the interest rate differentials 
between the local and international market assisted in furthering the transnationalization process. 
For the local entrepreneur selling his company, the flow of future returns was discounted at the 
interest rate existing in the local market, which was on average no less than two to three times 
                                                     
23 According to official estimates, between 1990 and 2000 seventy-eight billion dollars entered the 
country in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); thus, the amount of foreign capital grew at annual rates 
above 20% and surpassed eighty billion dollars in 2000. (Kulfas, Porta and Ramos, 2002). 
24  While in 1994 there were 69 foreign owned companies among the largest 200 industrial firms in the 
country, their participation in this group grew in a sustained fashion, increasing from 87 in 1995 to 129 
in 1998. In 1994, sales by foreign companies concentrated 43.4% of total sales by the largest 200 firms, 
while in 1998 such participation was remarkably higher, reaching 69.2% (Centro de Estudios para la 
Producción (CEP), 1999). In 2002, 325 of the largest 500 companies were subsidiaries of Transnational 
Companies (TNC) and generated more than 80% of the added value of this business elite. 
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greater than the international rate at which the TNC buyer operated. Furthermore, in certain cases, 
a technological factor came into play. In sectors that experienced technological progress at an 
intense pace beginning in the 1980s (information technology, telecommunications, machine-
tools) or where access to innovations was difficult (pharmaceuticals) local firms faced greater 
constraints to their performance. In summary, besides the tenders for foreign operators in 
privatized public services, the set of incentives implicit in the new rules, and the financial 
valorization strategy adopted by the large local agents, favored the transnationalization 
coefficients reached.  
In the production area, the main concern of the new investments was specialization and 
the increase in scale, which were decisive factors in the new conditions of competition. In the 
cases of growth by merger or purchase of local companies, the tendency was to vertically 
dismantle facilities, outsourcing certain sections, and rationalizing activities, downsizing 
administrative areas and maximizing corporate synergies. It is important to note that, as much as 
the firm’s previous history and some of its tangible and intangible assets were attraction factors 
and a good basis of the restructuring operations undertaken, in some cases the accumulated 
equipment imposed technical restrictions to the definition of new projects. In general, only in 
these cases, and in particular if new investors were involved, were new plants or greenfield 
investment projects developed. 
The marked increase in the degree of transnationalization of the Argentine economy was 
also reflected in the participation of TNC in foreign trade and, even though their presence was 
entirely predominant in the import flow, their contribution to exports was also substantial. The 
great majority of exports were concentrated in a reduced number of sectors based on natural 
resources, with the exception of the automotive industry. Two other striking facts give the 
Argentine case a certain singularity: in international terms, the participation of TNC in trade was 
comparatively high, and, at the same time, the internal market orientation of their operations was 
also much greater than in other FDI receiving countries.  
 
TABLE 2 
TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES STRATEGIES IN THE NINETIES 
Main Sectors Share in FDI flow 
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Source: Kulfas, M.; F. Porta and A. Ramos (2002). 
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Only those FDI strategies that are intensive in the use of natural resources generated a 
positive balance of trade. This occurred as a result of the strong orientation of these activities 
towards the export market based on natural advantages and their very low import propensity. In 
contrast, among the companies that engaged in predominantly market seeking strategies –present 
in the larger part of the manufacturing sector– there was a generalized trade deficit, even in the 
case of those firms that had a higher export coefficient than the national average and due to their 
particularly high reliance on final or intermediate imports. Moreover, this group displays a pattern 
of integration into the foreign market in which exports to Mercosur and imports outside of the 
region are predominant, combined with a strong component of intrafirm trade. As far as the 
availability of international commercialization channels may be a significant ownership 
advantage of a TNC, an important expected effect of FDI is its potential contribution to the net 
generation of foreign currency through exports. However, in the case of Argentina the evidence 
does not support this argument: the export performance of TNC seems to be associated with a 
deployment of strategies of specialization and complementarity among subsidiaries, layed out on 
the basis of regional commercial preferences.  
In summary, despite their preponderant participation in the country’s commercial flows 
and except for the singular case of the development of the automotive complex within the 
framework of sectoral integration in Mercosur, the strategies displayed by transnational 
corporations in the nineties do not appear to have contributed to modifying or diversifying the 
traditional pattern of Argentine exports. To the extent that these subsidiaries show a clearly 
greater import than export propensity –except in the obvious case of sectors based on agricultural 
resources– their actions are the main source of the trade deficit and, therefore, aggravate external 
restrictions. In addition, they reinforce a “dual” process of productive internationalization, which 
combines a pattern of intersector trade with markets in developed countries with a pattern of trade 
with regional markets of a relatively intrasector nature. Lastly, according to available estimates, 
probably no less than 25% of Argentine international trade corresponds to intrafirm flows. If so, 
the management of transfer prices may be common practice among firms and a serious economic 
policy problem.  
In recent years a significant contraction in FDI flows has been experienced. Although it is 
still difficult to differentiate between temporary and permanent changes, a boom similar to that of 
the nineties seems unlikely to occur.25 Furthermore, the possibility of a reduction in the 
participation of foreign companies cannot be discarded. In addition to volume, there are also 
questions as to what strategies they will follow: in general, subsidiaries have high import 
coefficients and low export coefficients. Based on the higher real exchange rate a gradual 
increase in export coefficients may ensue: the challenge consists of the development of “global 
products”. If so far their contribution to capital formation, to the accumulation of local 
technological capabilities, to the development of suppliers and the opening of markets was poor, 
it is nevertheless undeniable that TNC will be key actors in any strategy for sustained growth. 
Into the future, the question is not so much to attract a greater number of capital investments but 
to procure foreign investment of greater quality, in a highly transnationalized economy, with 
insufficient spill-over from FDI flows on the rest of activities.  
During a long time various authors stressed the importance of the quality of management 
for company performance. However, only recently have empirical studies appeared containing 
detailed information aiming to support this hypothesis. These studies attempt to quantify the 
contribution of executives and their different practices to productivity gaps that can be found 
                                                     
25 Since the 2001-2002 crisis, the purchase of Argentine companies by Brazilian firms suggests a certain 
ability by regional firms to take advantage of opportunities that emerge in high instability contexts in 
which the TNC of the developed world are absent or prefer to be absent.  
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among firms26 (and that cannot be explained by differences in location, sector, technology used or 
the capabilities of labor). Thus, evidence was produced that was consistent with the existence of a 
correlation between best practices in management and greater returns on capital, sales per 
employee or growth in market participation. Similarly, it was established that the heterogeneity of 
“styles” among executives explains differences between investment, financial or organizational 
practices. 
An aspect not yet covered by the above mentioned literature and that it is interesting to 
note in the case of Argentina is how the accumulation of idiosyncratic knowledge by 
management, produced by years of volatile behaviour in the economy, can affect the firm’s 
trajectory and performance. In particular, the latest crisis clearly demonstrated that knowledge 
accumulated through the years about how to act in the face of changing economic scenarios 
provided some local companies with a better interpretation of what could happen once the crisis 
accelerated and became a depression.  
In this respect, these management capabilities can be associated with the economic 
literature that interprets the entrepreneur’s actions as decision making under high uncertainty 
based on the individual’s particular judgement that attempts to anticipate and actively take 
advantage of changing conditions.27 This refers to those business decisions that contemplate a 
range of future results that are unknown (without even reflecting on the specific probability of 
their occurrence); it is what Knight (1921) called uncertainty to differentiate it from mere 
probabilistic risk. This entrepreneurial judgment is learned, accumulated and tends to involve 
components that are not explicitly acknowledged. 
These past experiences provide local management with greater flexibility to adapt 
adroitly, from a financial perspective as well as from a commercial standpoint. In times of crisis, 
when the decision horizon suddenly shortens, certain business mistakes in short term decision 
making related to daily operations can irreversively lead to a forced company sale or merger, or 
even permanent closure. These same mistakes, in other contexts, may only translate into a 
reduction in annual profitability, in economic losses, or into changing the manager of the 
subsidiary in a country that represents less than one percent of total sales. Therefore, the 
entrepreneurial capacity for day to day crisis management must be added as an asset to the 
structural strengths possessed by a company. 
A successful strategy applied by several local companies during the crisis was to protect 
the company’s working capital, which generally meant selling goods and services “cash only”. 
Implicitly, this involves the reduction of sales volumes and the loss of a portion of the market to 
the competition. Whichever the final objective sought, the fact that losses in market share are 
accepted can imply situations that are difficult to revert in the future. Decisions of this type 
generate strong internal tension in the attempt to maintain an adequate balance between financial 
and commercial aspects of the business (Kosacoff et al., 2001). 
                                                     
26 It is worth mentioning, among others, Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who analyzed the impact of changes 
in style and strategies resulting from the incorporation of new CEOs and CFOs in the development of 
United States companies, and Bloom et al. (2005), who measure the effects of the quality of practices 
applied by middle management in United States, United Kingdom, and French and German companies. 
27  Other concepts related to the entrepreneurial spirit that have been emphasized are the management of 
SMC or start-ups, possessing certain personal and psychological characteristics that result in greater 
creativity and imagination, Schumpeterian innovation in products and processes, the attitude of constant 
search for profit opportunities or the capacity for charismatic leadership (Foss and Klein, 2004; Ibrahim 
and Vyakarnam, 2003). 
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6. Final Considerations 
During turbulent times for Argentina, when horizons were shrinking and the lens of analysis 
focused on the short term, macroeconomic approximation to the problems of the economy was 
the absolute rule. As a consequence, the microeconomic foundations of those difficulties were 
unattended. In various articles it was suggested that responses by economic agents to 
macroeconomic policies and shocks could be considered, without risking oversimplification, as 
homogeneous and automatic. It was not noticed that to a certain extent the weakness of these 
foundations and some particularities in their operation could in turn generate macroeconomic 
problems themselves and contribute to their persistence in time. So much so, that, for example, a 
review of papers written about the recent Argentine crisis reveals that the great majority does not 
include among its explanatory arguments any direct consideration of microeconomic foundations.  
The connection between modes of productive organization, capacity development and 
training of human resources, and productivity and competitiveness gains is affected by real 
volatility and financial fragility, and they, in turn, feedback the process disrupting investing and 
growth. Therefore, consistency between macro and microeconomic schemes provides a solid 
basis for long term growth. The development of productive capacities is a complex process, 
which advances in uneven fashion and takes on specific characteristics according to the sector, 
region and country, and involves causalities and interactions that are not yet completely 
understood. The above notes sought to contribute some elements for a better understanding of 
these phenomena based on the Argentine case.  

ECLAC – Project document Microeconomic Behavior in High Uncertainty Environments: The case of Argentina 
41 
Bibliography 
Aizenman, J. and Pinto, B. (2005), Managing Economic Volatility and Crises: A Practitioner’s Guide, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Altimir, O., Santamaría, H. and Sourrouille J. (1966), “Los instrumentos de promoción industrial en la 
posguerra” in Desarrollo Económico, IDES, volumes 6 and 7, Buenos Aires. 
Anlló, G. and Peirano, F. (2005), Una mirada a los sistemas nacionales de innovación en el Mercosur: 
análisis y reflexiones a partir de los casos de Argentina y Uruguay, Serie Estudios y Perspectivas 
22, ECLAC Office, Buenos Aires. 
Artopoulos, A. (2004), “Nueva economía en Argentina. El caso de una empresa red: TENARIS”, 
presentado en el Seminario Interdisciplinario de la Sociedad de la Información directed by 
Professor Manuel Castells, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya. 
Ascúa, R. (2003), La creación de competencias dinámicas bajo un contexto de inestabilidad 
macroeconómica: el caso Edival, ECLAC, Buenos Aires. 
Baldwin, R. (1988), “Hysteresis in Import Prices: The Beachhead Effect”, American Economic Review, 78 
(4). 
Baldwin, R. and Krugman, P. (1989), “Persistent Trade Effects of Large Exchange Rate Shocks”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 54 (4). 
Barbero, M. I. (1995), “Treinta años de estudios sobre la historia de empresas en la Argentina”, Ciclos, Vol. 
V, N° 8. 
Bebczuk, R., Fanelli, J. and Pradelli, J. (2002), Determinants and Consequences of Financial Constraints 
Facing Firms in Argentina, 1992-99, Research Network Working paper, #R-453, Inter-American 
Development Bank, Latin American Research Network, Washington. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S. (1994), The financial accelerator and the flight to quality, NBER 
Working Paper, Number 4789, July. 
Bertrand, M. and Schoar, A. (2003), Managing with Style: the Effect of Managers on Firm Policies", 
Working papers 4280-02, MIT, Sloan School of Management. 
Bisang, R. (2003), “Apertura Económica, Innovación y Estructura Productiva: La Aplicación de 
Biotecnología en la Producción Agrícola Pampeana Argentina," Desarrollo Económico, Vol. 43, 
Nº 71, Buenos Aires. 
______ (2001), “Shock tecnológico y cambio en la organización de la producción. La aplicación de 
biotecnología en la producción agropecuaria argentina,” mimeo, Instituto de Industria, 
Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, Buenos Aires. 
Bisang, R. Bonvecchi, C., Kosacoff, B. and Ramos, A. (1996), La transformación industrial en los noventa. 
Un proceso con final abierto. Desarrollo Económico, Número especial, Vol. 35. 
Blinder, A. and Maccini, L. (1991), "The Resurgence of Inventory Research: What Have We Learned?” 
Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(4). 
Bloom, N., Dorgan, S., Dowdy, J., Van Reenen, J. and Rippin, T. (2005), Management Practices Across 
Firms and Nations, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, June. 
ECLAC – Project document  
 42
Brodersohn, M. (1972), “Financiamiento de empresas privadas y mercados de capital” in Programa 
Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo de Mercados de Capital, Buenos Aires. 
Campa, J. (2000), Exchange Rates and Trade: How important is Hysteresis in Trade?, Research Paper N. 
427, IESE Universidad de Navarra. 
______ (1993), "Entry by Foreign Firms in the United States under Exchange Rate Uncertainty" The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(4). 
Centro de Estudios para la Producción (Center for Studies on Production) (1999), Reporte Industrial 1999. 
La industria argentina ante los desafíos del próximo siglo. CEP, Secretaría de Industria, Comercio 
y Minería, Buenos Aires, December. 
Chudnovsky, D., Kosacoff, B. and López, A. (1999), Las multinacionales latinoamericanas. Sus estrategias 
en un mundo globalizado, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Buenos Aires. 
Chudnovsky, D. and López, A. (2001), La transnacionalización de la economía argentina, Eudeba, Buenos 
Aires. 
Chudnovsky, D., López, A. and Pupato, G. (2004), "Innovation and Productivity: A Study of Argentine 
Manufacturing Firms’ Behavior (1992-2001)", Universidad de San Andrés, WP Nº 70. 
Chudnovsky, D., Porta, F., López, A. and Chidiak, M. (1996), Los límites de la apertura. Liberalización, 
reestructuración industrial y medio ambiente. Alianza Editorial - CENIT, Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. 
Cimoli, M. (2005), “Redes, estructuras de mercado y shocks económicos. Cambios estructurales de los 
sistemas de innovación en América Latina” in Casalet, M., Cimoli, M. and Yoguel G., Redes, 
jerarquías y dinámicas productivas, FLACSO-OIT (ILO)-Miño and Dávila. 
Dal Bó, E. and B. Kosacoff (1998), “Líneas conceptuales ante evidencias microeconómicas de cambio 
estructural”, in B. Kosacoff (ed.), Estrategias Empresariales en Tiempos de Cambio, Universidad 
de Quilmes, Bernal. 
Dixit, A. and Pindyck, R. (1994), Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton U. Press, Princeton. 
Dunning, J. (1988), Explaning international production. Unwin Hyman, Londres. 
Easterly, W., Islam, R.and Stiglitz, J. (2000), Shaken and Stirred: Explaining Growth Volatility, The World 
Bank, Washington. 
Fanelli, J. (2003), “Growth, Instability and the Crisis of Convertibility in Argentina”, in FONDAD, The 
Crisis That Was Not Prevented: Argentina, the IMF, and Globalisation, January. 
Foss, N. and Klein, P. (2004), Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of the Firm: Any Gains from 
Trade?, The Center for Knowledge Governance Working Paper No. 11/2004, Department of 
Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School. 
Fuchs, M. (1994), Calificación de los recursos humanos e industrialización El desafío argentino de los años 
noventa, Working Paper Nº 57, ECLAC, Buenos Aires. 
Gatto, F. and Yoguel, G. (1993), “Las PyMEs Argentinas en una Etapa de Transición Productiva y 
Tecnológica”, in B. Kosacoff (ed.), El Desafío de la Competitividad. La Industria Argentina en 
Transformación, ECLAC/Alianza, Buenos Aires. 
Gerchunoff, P. and Llach, L. (2003), El ciclo de la Ilusión y el Desencanto. Un siglo de políticas 
económicas argentinas, Ariel Sociedad Económica. 
Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, C. (1994), “Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and the Behavior of Small 
Manufacturing Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(2). 
Guadagni, A. (1972), “Las tasas de interés negativas y la distorsión de la inversión real en la Argentina”, en 
Programa Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo de Mercados de Capital, Buenos Aires. 
Gutiérrez, C. (1999), “Política tecnológica y estrategia empresaria en un caso de transnacionalización: una 
empresa mendocina de ingeniería”, mimeo. 
Heymann, D. (2000), “Políticas de reforma y comportamiento macroeconómico: la Argentina en los 
noventa”, in Heymann y Kosacoff (editors): La Argentina de los noventa: desempeño económico 
en un contexto de reformas, Eudeba, Buenos Aires. 
Heymann, D. and P. Sanguinetti (1998), “Business cycles from misperceived trends”, Economic Notes Nº2. 
Hubbard, G. (1998), “Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
XXXVI, March. 
IADB-ECLAC-Ministry of Economics (2003), Componentes Macroeconómicos, Sectoriales y 
Microeconómicos para una Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo. Lineamientos para Fortalecer las 
Fuentes del Crecimiento Económico,” Buenos Aires. 
ECLAC – Project document Microeconomic Behavior in High Uncertainty Environments: The case of Argentina 
43 
Ibrahim, G. and Vyakarnam, S. (2003), Defining the Role of the Entrepreneur in Economic Thought: 
Limitations of Mainstream Economics, working paper, Nottingham Business School. 
INDEC (National Statistics and Census Institute)-SECYT (Department Science and Technology) (1998), 
Encuesta sobre la conducta tecnológica de las empresas industriales argentinas, Serie Estudios, N° 
31, Buenos Aires. 
INDEC-SECYT-ECLAC (2003), Segunda Encuesta Nacional de Innovación y conducta tecnológica de las 
empresas argentinas. 1998-2001, Serie Estudios, N° 38, Buenos Aires. 
Itzcovich, S. and Feldman, E. (1969), Un sistema de transacciones financieras para la Argentina, Instituto 
Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires. 
Kashyap, A., Lamont, O. and Stein J. (1994), “Credit Conditions and the Cyclical Behavior of Inventories”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (3). 
Katz, J. (1986), Desarrollo y crisis de la capacidad tecnológica latinoamericana, IADB-ECLAC-IDRC-
UNDP, Buenos Aires.  
Katz, J. and Kosacoff, B. (1998), “Aprendizaje tecnológico, desarrollo institucional y la microeconomía de 
la sustitución de importaciones”, Desarrollo Económico, N° 148, January-March. 
______ (1989), El proceso de industrialización en la Argentina: evolución, retroceso y prospectiva, CEAL, 
Buenos Aires. 
Knight, F. (1921), Risk, Uncertainty and Profits, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin. 
Kosacoff, B. editor (1994), El desafío de la competitividad. La industria argentina en transformación. 
Alianza Editorial - ECLAC, Buenos Aires. 
Kosacoff, B. (2000), Corporate Strategies Under Structural Adjustment in Argentina. Responses by 
Industrial Firms to a New Set of Uncertainties, St. Antony´s Series, St. Antony´s College and 
Antony Rowe Ltd., Wiltshire. 
______ (1999), "El caso argentino", in D. Chudnovsky, B. Kosacoff and A. López, Las multinacionales 
latinoamericanas. Sus estrategias en un mundo globalizado, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Buenos 
Aires. 
Kosacoff, B. and Ramos, A. (2001), Cambios contemporáneos en la estructura industrial argentina (1975-
2000), Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Bernal. 
Kosacoff B., J. Forteza, M. I. Barbero and A. Stengel (2001), Globalizar desde Latinoamérica. El caso 
Arcor, Mc Graw Hill, Bogotá. 
Kosacoff, B. (coord.), G. Anlló, C. Bianco, R. Bisang, C. Bonvecchi, F. Porta, A. Ramos, E. Spector and J. 
Zabala Suárez (2004), Evaluación de un escenario posible y deseable de reestructuración y 
fortalecimiento del Complejo Textil argentino, ECLAC, Buenos Aires. 
Kose, M., Prasad, E. and Terrones, M. (2005), “Growth and Volatility in an Era of Globalization”, IMF 
Staff Papers, Volume 52, Special Issue, September  
Kulfas, M.; F. Porta and A. Ramos (2002), La inversión extranjera en la Argentina, ECLAC/United 
Nations, Buenos Aires, 2002. 
López, A. (2005), Empresarios, instituciones y desarrollo económico: el caso argentino, mimeo, Buenos 
Aires ECLAC Office. 
______ (2002), Sistema nacional de innovación y desarrollo económico: una interpretación del caso 
argentino, PhD Thesis, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos 
Aires. 
Lugones, G. and Lugones, M. (2004), Bariloche y su grupo de empresas intensivas en conocimiento: 
realidades y perspectivas, REDES Centro de Estudios sobre Ciencia, Desarrollo y Educación 
Superior, Documento de Trabajo Nº 17, Buenos Aires. 
Maccini, L., Moore, B. and Schaller, H. (2004), The Interest Rate, Learning, and Inventory Adjustment, 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 5, December. 
Moori Koenig, V. and Yoguel, G. (1995), Perfil de la inserción externa y conducta exportadora de las 
Pymes argentinas. ECLAC, Working Paper N° 65. 
Nelson, R. (1991), Why do firms differ, and how does it matter?. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12. 
Ordóñez, H. and J. Nichols (2003), Agribusiness Turbulent Scenarios, Emerging Economies, Los Grobo 
Case, UBA and TEXAS A & M, Enero. 
Porta, F. and Kosacoff, B. (1997), La inversión extranjera directa en la industria argentina; tendencias y 
estrategias recientes. 
ECLAC – Project document  
 44
Possas, M. (1996): “Competitividad de Factores sistêmicos E Política Industrial. Implicasoes para Brasil”. 
Castro, Possas and Proense (de.); Estrategias empresariais na industria brasileira. Discutindo 
mudanças. Forense Universitarias, Rio de Janeiro. 
Ramos, A. (1995), Hacia la calidad total: la difusión de las normas ISO de la Serie 9000 en la industria 
argentina, Working Paper Nº 66, Buenos Aires ECLAC Office. 
Roberts, M., Sullivan, T. and Tybout, J. (1995), “Micro Foundations of Export Booms,” Working Paper, 
Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University. 
Roberts, M. and Tybout, J. (1997), "The Decision to Export in Colombia: An Empirical Model of Entry 
with Sunk Costs" American Economic Review, vol. 87(4). 
Schvarzer, J. (1997): La estructura productiva argentina a mediados de la década del noventa. Tendencias 
visibles y un diagnóstico con interrogantes. Centro de Estudios Económicos de la Empresa y el 
Desarrollo, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, 
Universidad de Buenos Aires. 
______ (1996), La Industria que Supimos Conseguir. Una Historia Político-Social de la Industria 
Argentina, Planeta, Buenos Aires. 
______ (1989), Bunge y Born. Crecimiento y diversificación de un grupo económico, CISEA/GEL, Buenos 
Aires. 
______ (1981), El Banco Nacional de Desarrollo y el Desarrollo Tecnológico en la Industria Argentina, 
Unión Argentina de Ingenieros, Comité de Tecnología, Buenos Aires. 
SECYT-Ministry of Education (2005), Bases para un Plan Estratégico de Mediano Plazo en Ciencia, 
Tecnología e Innovación, Buenos Aires. 
Sourrouille, J., B. Kosacoff and J. Lucangeli (1985), Transnacionalización y política económica en la 
Argentina, CEAL-CET, Buenos Aires. 
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, American 
Economic Review, June, 71 (3). 
Villanueva, J. (1972), “El origen de la industrialización argentina”, Desarrollo Económico, N° 47, vol.12, 
Buenos Aires, IDES. 
Vispo, A. and Kosacoff, B. (1991), Difusion de tecnologías de punta en Argentina. Algunas reflexiones 
sobre la organización de la producción industrial de IBM, ECLAC, Working Paper N° 38, Buenos 
Aires. 
Yoguel, G. and R. Rabetino (2002), “La incorporación de tecnología en la industria manufacturera 
argentina en los noventa: los factores determinantes”, in R. Bisang, G. Lugones and G. Yoguel 
(eds.), Apertura e Innovación en la Argentina. Para Desconcertar a Vernon, Schumpeter y 
Freeman, Editorial Miño y Dávila. Buenos Aires. 
______ (2000), "El Desarrollo de las Capacidades Tecnológicas de los Agentes de la Industria 
Manufacturera Argentina en los Años Noventa”, in B. Kosacoff (ed.), El Desempeño Industrial 
Argentino. Más Allá de la Sustitución de Importaciones, ECLAC, Buenos Aires. 
 
